英文原文：

The Wire China: Let’s begin with the question that forms the title of your book: Should the world fear China?

Zhou Bo：My answer is definitely NO, but I should explain further. When people talk about fear of China, it comes primarily from Western countries, whose global dominance has been in place for a few hundred years. Seeing China’s rise raises a lot of questions for them.

But if you look at the rest of the world, people’s opinions of China, generally speaking, are positive. In Latin America, China’s economic influence is very strong: Chinese and American influence is probably about half and half. In the Indo Pacific, the picture is a bit patchy, but last year, for the first time in at least five years, China’s approval rating prevailed over that of the United States slightly. That is understandable given that ASEAN has become the largest trading partner of China. But of course you also have countries like India, whose attitude toward China is much more complicated, largely because of the deadly brawl in the Himalayan mountains in 2020.

At this year’s Munich Security Conference, the talk was of the world moving towards multi-polarization. This trend is inevitable, and the West needs to change its mentality. I never bought this idea of a liberal international order. I believe the order now, as in the past, is a hybrid of all kinds of cultures, religions, social systems and, above all, civilizations. If you believe you’re just a part of this order, and not the whole order, then it’s easier for you to co-exist with others. But if you wrongly believe that the global order should be the liberal international order, you would feel sad when you see the world is moving in another direction, and then you would probably look for an enemy. And that’s exactly what the United States is doing.

The Wire China：But people see incidents like the clashes in the Himalayas with India, or the pressure that China places on countries in the South China Sea or on Taiwan, and they fear that China is an expansionist power that wants to change the world order, not just exist within it.

Zhou Bo：The three places you mention are associated with China’s sovereignty, and China is firm on sovereignty issues. There’s a border dispute between India and China: it is about sovereignty. In the South China Sea, we also believe it is about sovereignty. On the Taiwan issue, more than 180 countries believe it is part of China. This has nothing to do with how China looks at the world.

When the United States sends aircraft or ships to the region, either for reconnaissance, surveillance or to exercise so-called Freedom of Navigation, they believe they are challenging China’s exercise of its maritime rights. But China considers the rocks and islands to be Chinese territory. So then it becomes a question of sovereignty for China.

The Wire China: So it’s not that China wants to expand, it’s just that it is claiming what it believes belongs to it; and that is the limit of China’s territorial ambitions?

Zhou Bo：I have never believed that China is an expansionist power. I don’t believe China has any ambition to have spheres of influence. Even if China wanted that, it cannot succeed.

Let’s look at China’s periphery, where theoretically, it would be easiest for China to establish a sphere of influence. In Northeast Asia, the DPRK won’t listen to China, especially on nuclear issues. Then we come to Southeast Asia, often described as China’s backyard. We have quite a few countries that have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea; and there are at least two American allies, Thailand and the Philippines. So how can China take that as its sphere of influence?

What China does have is huge global influence, especially in the economic field. Precisely because China’s influence is already global, it doesn’t need to follow the United States in establishing spheres of influence, which are very costly to build and very difficult to maintain. If China has enough global influence, but at the same time keeps away from having spheres of influence, this could be very affordable and cost effective. You can make yourself totally different from hegemons throughout history, and be welcomed.

If you look at the PLA, all its operations overseas are humanitarian in nature, be it peacekeeping, counter-piracy or disaster relief. This is a deliberate policy choice, and my hope is that the PLA will carry on like this. In this way you can just do humanitarian things: it’s easy, and people will be grateful to you. You don’t need to have bases, allies and all these things.

The Wire China：What about fears that China is a revisionist power that wants other countries to conform to its model. Is the West wrong to fear that?

Zhou Bo：As Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi pointed out at the Munich Security Conference, China has joined over 600 global treaties. To put it another way, it’s hard to think of any other treaties that China has not joined.

There is a good reason for China not to challenge the international system, whatever it is, because it has benefited China. In the last 40 years, there have been a number of reasons for China’s success — of course, one is the Chinese people’s diligence and industry. But China has also learned tremendously from the Western experience — technology, the market economy, and all these things. That is why the Chinese attitude towards the international order is different from Russia’s. Russia resents this order.

When you come to this issue of the Chinese model, what do you imagine that China wants to export? China exports a lot of products. But if China wants to export its ideology, there aren’t many socialist countries in the world to receive it. I don’t believe the West believes that China wants to export communism or the socialism that is in its own system. You need to give me more of a clue as to when or how China has tried to change the international order as a revisionist power.

The Wire China：You would argue, then, that the West has misinterpreted China’s intentions. What do you think China’s got wrong, though? Is there more that it could be doing to reassure other countries of its intentions and of the nature of its power?

Zhou Bo：Your question reminds me of how I felt after a two-day long meeting between China and the United States. There were experts on both sides, but it was really a conference of both saying, ‘What do you want?’ I started to think this China-U.S. relationship is like a religion, where the most simple question is also the most complicated.

From my experience of interacting with people, I basically believe that no matter how sophisticated they might be, their central logic is formed from the way they are educated. You grow up with a set of values that becomes deeply rooted in your own mentality: and the world is not the same in different people’s eyes. The only solution is for people to interact more and try to understand other people’s cultures and values.

Over the last 40 years plus, China hasn’t killed a single foreigner overseas. So how can China be called aggressive or coercive? Sometimes, I believe the West tries to blackmail China by using such words, because they cannot give a tangible example of anything China has done. But then you look at the United States — how many wars has it launched and how many people have been killed?

The Wire China:China has started to become more involved in big geopolitical issues outside of its borders. An example would be the work that China did to get Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore diplomatic relations. Is this something we’re going to see more of, particularly in the Middle East?

Zhou Bo：The answer is definitely yes. And like it or not, that is the road of the future. China wants to make more of a contribution, but in its own way.

There have been two turning points recently. One is for China’s diplomacy: its success in the mediation between Saudi Arabia and the Iranians. The other is countering pirates in the Gulf of Aden, which has turned the Chinese navy into a Blue Water Navy. These are two turning points, one for China diplomacy, another for the Chinese military.

Another example is still more telling. China has a hospital ship which belongs to its navy. For decades, this ship has been sailing overseas, providing free medicine and treatments to local people. This is unusual, because, why would you provide people with free medical care? I think this tells you that China wants to be loved rather than feared.

The other thing is, China will be pushed by others to become more involved, because if you become strong, you become attractive; just like if you are a rich man, probably a lot of your poor relatives will come to you. China, as a stronger power, will have to take care of a lot of things that it did not previously envision. This is the price you have to pay as a major power.

There have been three other recent turning points for China. After the war in Ukraine started, people immediately asked where China was standing, because it’s so important, and so close to Russia. The second came after U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference: because other countries were totally stunned by what he said, they started to look for a center of gravity. People want a stabilizer and an anchor. And the third turning point is Trump’s tariff war, because he’s punching every country, although to varying degrees. People, of course, are looking for stability. And China seems to be the only country that has the strength and will to resist this kind of pressure. That is why I believe China’s international standing is growing — but at the same time, its responsibilities are also growing.

The Wire China：But once you start getting involved in big geopolitical problems, the danger is that you start to get blamed when things go wrong. Is China ready for that?

Zhou Bo：Well, China is learning, and these are complicated issues. Once you get in, you cannot walk out. When China started on its reform and opening up era, Deng Xiaoping said it was getting across the river by feeling the stones in the riverbed. But now we’re wading into the sea: there is no turning back.

I wish for China to stick to some rules, even if it becomes stronger. You don’t need to seek spheres of influence. And you should exercise maximum caution when using force, because if you kill people for this or that reason, and eventually you find you were wrong — like in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan — and people’s lives are already lost, you can’t come back. And then stick to the principle of never being the first to use nuclear weapons. These kinds of principles, if followed, can really make the world safer, if not better.

The Wire China：Do you share the view that the U.S. is now a power in decline?

Zhou Bo：My short answer is, definitely. The U.S.’s GDP was equivalent to half that of the world after the Second World War, but it now accounts for only a quarter. Of course this is a relative decline, but it is considerable.

But who is the largest declinist? It’s not the Chinese, it’s Donald Trump. Donald Trump was very smart in making use of this to win his first presidential election, describing ‘American carnage’. Then, of course, he peppered it up by saying we’ll make America great again. But his current practice of bashing all countries indiscriminately, but to a very varying degree …How can the strongest nation on Earth do that, unless it feels that it is in a hopeless decline and has become desperate. How can a man like Trump be elected in a country that has produced George Washington and Abraham Lincoln? This is the man who incited people to take on Capitol Hill. It shows how this country has become divided.

In a way, he’s a bit like Mikhail Gorbachev. People describe Gorbachev as a man who destroyed the building from the top down, without having a new building in place. Trump is doing the same thing, adding tariffs and then another tariff, without thinking about how the factories could be in place in the U.S. before he does so. It’s totally out of order and chaotic, and this adds to people’s impressions of America being in hopeless decline.

The Wire China：You write in your book that China is being asked about the Russia-Ukraine war that’s taking place thousands of miles away, in which it is not involved. Isn’t it a bit difficult to say that China isn’t supporting Russia in this war?

Zhou Bo：Well, first of all, China certainly is not Russia’s ally. This kind of relationship is like two lines in parallel. No matter how close they are, they won’t overlap to become an alliance. This war has already proven that this is indeed not an alliance, as we are not sending soldiers to fight with Russia, and we’re not providing them with lethal weapons. If we really were sending military supplies, it wouldn’t go uncovered.

As for exports, you should not take that as any kind of support. It’s normal trading which was already in place before the war. What is different is that China has exported more because Russia was denied access to the European market. They had to buy more from China, and as China’s economy was not really in good shape it wanted to export more, so long as it did not go against any international treaties or rules. Some of the products happen to be dual use in nature, which is one of the main reasons for Western complaints. But when something is dual use in nature, you have to assume it is for civilian use first. This is common sense, just like oil and gas: if you put them into a military truck, they are military products. But normally nobody would consider gas and oil as military products.

The Wire China：But circling back to something that you said at the start, that China views the world as multipolar now, and different civilizations need to learn not to interfere in each other’s affairs: what is more interfering than invading another country? If China is sticking to principles of non-interference, why wasn’t it more forceful in telling Russia that it shouldn’t invade Ukraine?

Zhou Bo：That’s a good question. Actually, China has mentioned Russia’s invasion in another, more subtle way. It is not forceful, as you said, but immediately after the war broke out, China called for respect for sovereignty.

There is a reason behind that: we are each other’s two largest neighbors, and have enjoyed a good relationship. And there is also an element of Asian culture, which seems to be more subtle in expression. But China did mention, almost immediately, respect for sovereignty and in UN resolutions, many times China has abstained and did not support Russia.

The Wire China：But if China could make more open efforts to rein in Russia, that could actually be a huge benefit in terms of its relations with Europe and with the United States. Is China missing an opportunity here?

Zhou Bo：That is debatable. It depends on how you are looking at this issue, from the short term or the long term perspective. Let’s imagine you condemn Russia: you lose a friend, and while you may have a short term friendship with European countries, won’t the U.S. come back to compete with you again? You won’t solve this problem, so the best thing China can do is to maintain a good relationship with its friend.

We have tried very hard to strike a balance. It’s not easy for us, because both Russia and Ukraine are basically China’s friends, and Ukraine still has China as a large trading partner. I once talked to a Ukrainian scholar, and he said something that surprised me. He said, I personally understand why China is behaving like this. If I were you, I probably would be more or less like you.

The Wire China：Let’s move on to Taiwan — as you write in your book, the most obvious potential area for actual conflict between the U.S. and China in the coming years. As an ex-colonel in the PLA, can you explain what Beijing’s intentions towards Taiwan now are, and how it intends to achieve its goals.

Zhou Bo：First of all, I don’t believe that the Taiwanese issue is the most serious issue. Actually, I believe the South China Sea is more serious. Why? Because it’s easier to see an accident occurring there, caused by some sort of collision which, while it may not spill over into conflict, may be dangerous enough, given public opinion on both sides.

In the Taiwan Strait, whatever happens, it won’t be triggered by an accident. That is almost the last thing that will happen, because everybody has their eyes on this issue. Any move from either Beijing, Taipei or Washington comes under close scrutiny. Every word is amplified and examined — it’s not something that would be triggered by accident.

Beijing, right now, still wants peaceful reunification. When our leaders talk about this issue, that is what they say. The question is, how to achieve this?

First of all, reunification is a must. It’s not a situation, as the West may hope, where the current kind of cross-Strait relationship will always be maintained. No. China wants peaceful reunification, that is for sure.

The only question is whether they can achieve this through peaceful means. That is a real challenge. It is still possible for China to become the strongest nation on earth, the largest economy. And with all this development, are we saying China cannot reunify with another part of China that is recognized by most countries in the world?

This is incomprehensible for Chinese people. Right now, we have not lost our patience. As China becomes stronger, it could think in two different ways. One way is to become more confident about peaceful reunification. The other way is it becomes more impatient, and decides it has to use force. There’s just these two options. Of course, peaceful reunification is more preferable.

To achieve that, my answer is very simple: Just let the Chinese government believe peaceful reunification is still possible. If the Chinese government believes it’s possible, then it will bear this situation with patience — because this is one of the conditions written into China’s anti-secession law. Three conditions for abandoning non-peaceful means are in that law. First, that Taiwan declares independence, which is anyway impossible. Second, that foreign forces are making efforts leading to Taiwan’s separation from China. I personally don’t know of any foreign force which is strong enough to do this.

For me, only the third condition really matters: that is if the central government believes that all possibilities for peaceful reunification have been exhausted. That is why I say we have to let China believe that peaceful reunification is still possible. And for that to happen, then the Taiwanese authorities and the United States have to behave. They have to exercise self restraint. Our response to Lai Ching-te has been more severe because of what he has said. He has basically talked like a separatist or secessionist, talking about mainland China being an external power. The Chinese government cannot bear that.

The Wire China：But what if the Taiwanese people don’t want to be part of mainland China?

Zhou Bo：I think public opinion in Taiwan may change under different situations. In Taiwan’s legislature, the Kuomintang party, which is somewhat closer to mainland China, actually has a marginal majority. And if this kind of situation becomes more serious, the Taiwanese may think, okay, who has caused this problem? Is it the military exercises carried out by mainland China, or is it because of provocative remarks from the Taiwanese leader? A lot of complaints have been made against him because of his description of this relationship with mainland China.

Before Covid, there were about 1.5 million Taiwanese people living in mainland China, most near Shanghai. That shows people will always go for better opportunities to survive and thrive. And if they believe mainland China can offer them better opportunities, they actually don’t care that much about living in a different society where the same rules do not apply to them. They live just like foreigners, and probably better than foreigners, because in Fujian province the Chinese government has given them a lot of preferential treatment. They can buy real property. The children can go to kindergarten like other children, and their ID cards are very much like those of mainlanders. People always talk about China’s sticks, but we have offered some carrots too.

The Wire China：If mainland China did seek to take Taiwan by force, does Beijing believe that the U.S., whether it’s under Trump or a future president, would seek to defend it?

Zhou Bo：First of all, up till now the Chinese government still has patience. That is quite clear. We’re not threatening immediate war.

I think all American governments talk about the One China policy and will continue to do so. But the content of One China changes if you keep on providing Taiwan with more and more advanced weapons. That’s why the Chinese government believes the U.S. is hollowing out One China.

In American think tanks, there’s a debate as to whether they should have strategic ambiguity or strategic clarity over Taiwan. The result, of course, is ambiguity, because if it is made clear that the U.S. has to defend Taiwan, they will have no leeway. In the past, the policy of ambiguity was based upon strength. Strategic clarity would actually show the U.S.’s shortcomings: it would show that the U.S. is no longer that strong, and that they would have to spend to defend Taiwan.

As to whether the U.S. would defend Taiwan or not we don’t know. I think they haven’t made their determination either.

What is becoming clear is that in terms of conventional warfare, the mainland’s strength is growing, and this seems to be people’s impression in the U.S.. They have even talked about it themselves, about how in war games, the U.S. loses to China — to the extent that some people, like Eldridge Colby, have called for nuclear strikes in the Taiwan Strait, because they do not have any superiority in conventional warfare. So I would suggest that China increase its nuclear weapons arsenal. Not to reach parity with the U.S., but to the extent that the United States would give up for good its illusion that it can win in a nuclear war.

At the same time, China should still stick to its policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, because these are two separate issues. If all other nuclear powers adopted this ‘no first use’ policy, that would make the world safer. Right now, if you talk about countries reducing their nuclear weapons stockpiles, that is impossible, because we’re not starting at the same level.

As for allies. I truly believe that very few countries would come to America’s assistance should there be a war in the Taiwan Strait. There aren’t many potential allies: the first is Japan, but the overwhelming majority of Japanese people are against a direct conflict with China. That is understandable. China is such a powerful country with nuclear weapons. Why would Japan want to have a war with China? According to a report by Rand, nobody knows whether Japan would join or not: only at the critical moment would a Japanese leader have to decide. Any other description of their posture is just speculation.

Then we come to Australia. First of all, it is not a sure thing that they will really succeed in buying eight nuclear power summaries or not at this stage [under the AUKUS agreement, Australia is building five new submarines with the support of the U.S. and UK, and buying a further three from the U.S.]. And even if they succeeded, then it would be probably after 2035. How useful would those eight submarines be in a war with China, given how much stronger the Chinese navy might have become by then?

And then we come to the Philippines. Its naval bases could be used by the United States, which could be very useful as they are on the front line. That could be what Americans want most, the forward military presence. But Filipinos are not stupid. They have laid down different conditions for the U.S. to use these bases, such as not storing ammunition weapons, and not launching attacks.

You can’t give me another example of a potential ally. India is far away and is always maneuvering among major powers. If you look at the Quad, of which it’s a member, the Quad is not becoming a military alliance.

Should there be a war between China and the U.S., these American allies are at best half hearted, for obvious reasons, so I don’t believe they would play a very important role.

The Wire China：You talked about the risk of an incident in the South China Sea being more likely to lead to conflict right now. In that case, wouldn’t it be in China’s interests to be less aggressive in the way that it’s asserting its claims in that area?

Zhou Bo：Well, to put it briefly, any conflict in the South China Sea can only be between China and the U.S., because of American ships getting too close, so there could be an accident or a collision. It’s more dangerous because I don’t know how to resolve this issue. I led a Chinese delegation to the Pentagon to talk about this many years ago, but we could not agree, for example, on how International Maritime law could be applicable to both of us in an acceptable way, because we just have a different interpretation of the law.

I personally don’t believe there is a danger of any conflict whatsoever between China and other places, including the Philippines in the South China Sea. There are a number of reasons behind that. The Declaration of code of conduct in the South China Sea, made in 2002, has made it clear that there can be no use of force. This was signed between China and the 10 ASEAN countries. So, there is a kind of understanding there.

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