英文原文：

Last month, the Arctic Council broke the ice by agreeing to reconvene its working group meetings virtually, nearly two years after seven of its eight members, including the US, halted participation in protest against the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which held the council chairmanship then.

The working groups had been relying on “written procedures” for the last six months, after Norway took over the chairmanship and found ways to resume project work. The latest development will hopefully pave the way for increased interaction and engagement between council members, which also include Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden.

Over the last two years, there has been a big shift in Arctic geopolitics. After the Ukraine war broke out, Sweden and Finland departed from their long-standing military non-alignment policy and applied to join Nato. Sweden officially became a member of the transatlantic security alliance this month, while Finland joined last April.

With Nato extending its northern reach, Russia has been keeping a close eye on the Nordic Response, military drills between Finland, Norway and Sweden that represent the Arctic arm of the Nato-wide Steadfast Defender military exercise this year, its largest ever.

Russia views the increasing presence of Nato forces near its borders as a threat and has reinforced its military capabilities in its northern and western territories to counter Nato’s expansion. While Russia has not yet considered withdrawing from the Arctic Council, it has suspended its annual payments to it.

Amid Russia’s unpredictability, Greenland is seeking stronger ties with the United States and Canada, and pushing to establish a high-level Arctic-North American forum that would include leaders from all the indigenous territories. Meanwhile, US troops stationed in Alaska, redesignated as the Arctic division in 2022, are developing as an Arctic force and collaborating with Norway, Canada, Finland and Sweden in joint exercises.

Besides the geopolitical shifts, it is imperative to acknowledge the notable economic challenges for the Arctic. Economic sanctions on Russia and the withdrawal of Western companies, particularly in the oil and gas sector, have led to reduced international traffic and operators using the Russian-controlled Northern Sea Route, the Arctic’s main shipping corridor.

Transit cargo along the route plunged to 41,000 tonnes in 2022, from just over 2 million tonnes the year before. Last year, it made a miraculous recovery to 2.1 million tonnes, a record high, with more than 95 per cent of it comprised deliveries to or from China. Some analysts attributed the record tonnage to China’s robust demand for Russian crude oil, with Russia taking steps to ship some of its product using the Northern Sea Route after the European Union stopped importing Russian oil.

The stalling of Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project is another economic aspect arising from the Ukraine crisis. This liquefied natural gas project, deemed crucial to Russia’s endeavour to increase its LNG market share to 20 per cent by 2030 from 8 per cent, was due to start production last year.

Besides Russia’s Novatek with a 60 per cent stake, the project’s shareholders are France’s TotalEnergies, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and a consortium of Japan’s Mitsui and Co and JOGMEC, each with 10 per cent. These foreign shareholders have suspended participation after the US imposed sanctions, according to Russian news last December. Mitsui is reportedly withdrawing its employees from the project while TotalEnergies has started a force majeure process and will not take any LNG from the project this year.

When asked whether China’s CNPC and CNOOC had pulled out of the LNG 2 project, however, foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said both countries were continuing “normal economic and trade cooperation” and that this “should not be subject to interference or restrictions from any third party”. Both CNPC and CNOOC have reportedly asked the US government for exemptions from sanctions on the LNG 2 project.

Next month, the EU is expected to vote on proposed measures to block imports from LNG 2. But EU countries remain divided on how to phase out Russian Arctic LNG, with some voicing concern that the proposed moves may not be enough to undo long-term contracts.

Despite the geopolitical and economic shifts, however, scientific cooperation in the Arctic remains one of the few areas where the international community shares more common concerns than divergent views.

There is a long tradition of scientific collaboration between nations in this region, and the conflict in Ukraine has presented a unique challenge for climate researchers and scientists. Official Arctic Council meetings have been paused since May 2022 and with that, scientific cooperation among the eight Arctic states at the institutional level.

Nevertheless, there remains an urgent need for a global effort to adapt to climate change and mitigate its profound effect on communities, including the 40 indigenous peoples who comprise roughly 10 per cent of the Arctic’s total population of four million.

The Arctic Council’s resumption of project-level work is both significant and timely, and will help the council to fulfil its mandate as the leading and permanent forum for Arctic governance. The effectiveness of the Arctic Council’s working groups in tackling environmental, climatic and social development issues is also vital for the welfare of the Arctic communities.

Nonetheless, the uncertainty surrounding Russia’s next steps persists.

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